Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Observability and lying / T. Fries, U. Gneezy, A. Kajackaite, D. Parra. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 189:(2021 Sep), pp. 132-149. [10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038]
Observability and lying
A. Kajackaite
;
2021
Abstract
Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Fries Gneezy Kajackaite Parra 2021.pdf
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Obervability and Lying WP.pdf
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