Purpose – The proliferation of traceability standards shed light on the understanding of the mechanisms leading agri-food firms to choose among different kind of rules and systems for their implementation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of firms economic incentives on the adoption of different traceability systems. In specific, the analysis aims at segmenting food firms on the basis of economic incentives for the adoption of voluntary traceability and the levels of the system complexity implemented. Design/methodology/approach – A survey based on an ad hoc questionnaire was conducted in 2014 on a sample of firms certified ISO 22005/2008. Cluster analysis was run for the analysis and one-way ANOVA was used to confirm differences among clusters. Findings – The analysis presents three different clusters in terms of economic incentives for voluntary traceability and the level of systems complexity implemented. All the clusters reveal that supply chain incentives play a key role. Moreover, “fine traceability” clusters firms with high level of traceability. They consider food safety as an important incentive to adopt a voluntary standard. “Medium traceability” groups firms with an average level of traceability system complexity. The interviewed consider the firm reputation as strategic driver for voluntary standard implementation. The cluster “coarse traceability” groups firms which introduced traceability for quality differentiation of products on the market. These firms implemented a low level of traceability system complexity. Research limitations/implications – The paper presents some limitations due to the sample dimension. Future research is oriented to test such results on an extended sample and to analyse the relationships between the traceability system implemented and the different kind of economic incentives for traceability standards. Originality/value – The present paper offers two main contributions. From a conceptual point of view it tries to deepen existing knowledge on the mechanisms regulating the existence of different traceability standards. From a managerial point of view, the analysis contributes in the understanding of firm strategies in relation to the adoption of different traceability systems. Such results could address firm management on the allocation of financial resources for the adoption of different traceability systems.
Voluntary traceability standards and the role of economic incentives / S. Stranieri, A. Cavaliere, A. Banterle. - In: BRITISH FOOD JOURNAL. - ISSN 0007-070X. - 118:5(2016 May), pp. 1025-1040. [10.1108/BFJ-04-2015-0151]
Voluntary traceability standards and the role of economic incentives
S. StranieriPrimo
;A. CavaliereSecondo
;A. BanterleUltimo
2016
Abstract
Purpose – The proliferation of traceability standards shed light on the understanding of the mechanisms leading agri-food firms to choose among different kind of rules and systems for their implementation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of firms economic incentives on the adoption of different traceability systems. In specific, the analysis aims at segmenting food firms on the basis of economic incentives for the adoption of voluntary traceability and the levels of the system complexity implemented. Design/methodology/approach – A survey based on an ad hoc questionnaire was conducted in 2014 on a sample of firms certified ISO 22005/2008. Cluster analysis was run for the analysis and one-way ANOVA was used to confirm differences among clusters. Findings – The analysis presents three different clusters in terms of economic incentives for voluntary traceability and the level of systems complexity implemented. All the clusters reveal that supply chain incentives play a key role. Moreover, “fine traceability” clusters firms with high level of traceability. They consider food safety as an important incentive to adopt a voluntary standard. “Medium traceability” groups firms with an average level of traceability system complexity. The interviewed consider the firm reputation as strategic driver for voluntary standard implementation. The cluster “coarse traceability” groups firms which introduced traceability for quality differentiation of products on the market. These firms implemented a low level of traceability system complexity. Research limitations/implications – The paper presents some limitations due to the sample dimension. Future research is oriented to test such results on an extended sample and to analyse the relationships between the traceability system implemented and the different kind of economic incentives for traceability standards. Originality/value – The present paper offers two main contributions. From a conceptual point of view it tries to deepen existing knowledge on the mechanisms regulating the existence of different traceability standards. From a managerial point of view, the analysis contributes in the understanding of firm strategies in relation to the adoption of different traceability systems. Such results could address firm management on the allocation of financial resources for the adoption of different traceability systems.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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