A recent literature has found a positive relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral system and the convergence of parties’ positions. Such a relationship depends crucially on the assumption that voting is sincere. We show that, when voters are players in the game and not simply automata that vote for their favorite party, two policy-motivated parties always take extreme positions in equilibrium.
Electoral competition with strategic voters / C. Meroni. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 160(2017 Nov), pp. 64-66. [10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.002]
Electoral competition with strategic voters
C. Meroni
2017
Abstract
A recent literature has found a positive relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral system and the convergence of parties’ positions. Such a relationship depends crucially on the assumption that voting is sincere. We show that, when voters are players in the game and not simply automata that vote for their favorite party, two policy-motivated parties always take extreme positions in equilibrium.File in questo prodotto:
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