Ministers can have an incentive to adopt policies through secondary legislation that deviates from the general compromise reached via the primary legislation. We suggest that when secondary legislation is at stake, in some countries coalition partners can rely upon the ex-ante legal scrutiny of courts as an extra-cabinet control mechanism. We focus on the interaction between governments and the Council of State, the highest administrative court and the most important consultative body of the government in Italy. Our findings support the general hypothesis that the Council’s activism as an advisor is generated by the demand for control mechanisms on the secondary legislation. Such a demand is affected by specific political conditions, i.e. the level of government heterogeneity and government alternation. The findings on the Italian case can be a starting point for research on the different levels of involvement of administrative courts in the executive politics that characterize European Democracies.
Courts as extra-cabinet control mechanisms for secondary legislation: evidence from Italy / E. Rebessi, F. Zucchini. - In: RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA. - ISSN 0048-8402. - 50:2(2020 Jul), pp. 159-172.
|Titolo:||Courts as extra-cabinet control mechanisms for secondary legislation: evidence from Italy|
REBESSI, ELISA (Primo) (Corresponding)
ZUCCHINI, FRANCESCO (Secondo)
|Parole Chiave:||Coalition governance; courts; Italian political system; multiparty politics; secondary legislation|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||lug-2020|
|Data ahead of print / Data di stampa:||lug-2019|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2019.31|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|
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