Predicati vaghi e coerenza cognitiva

I intend to offer an analysis oJ vagueness and of rhe sorites paradox, adopting the notion of cognitive coherence and arguing in disfavour of semantic coherence which has been fiequemly adopred by phllosophers as a relevant crirerion to approach rhe sorires paradox. According ro thc semantic method what is relevant is what determines the rruth value of asserrions with vague predicares, while according to rhe cognitive method ir is essential to consider rh~, rules which govem the application and the non-applicarion of such predicates."ln}hh work, I propose to substirute rhe notion of minimal semantic coherencewith tht'notion of minimal cognitive coherence. My presentation is divided into the following sections: (l) after presenting the sorites paradox, I explain what I mean by minimal semanric coherence; (2) I introduce the notion of cognitive coherence and argue in disfavour of semantic coherence; (3} l compare the cognitive approach with theverificationist approach and I present Wright\.. argument far the incoherence of vague predicates if the laner approach is adopted; (4) l presenta revision ofWright's assumptions and I defend rhe idea that minimal cognitiw coherence is relevant.