The paper pinpoints certain unrecognized difficulties that surface for recombination and duplication in modal realism when we ask whether the following inter-world fixity claims hold true: 1) A property is perfectly natural in a world iff it is perfectly natural in every world where it is instantiated; 2) Something is mereologically atomic in a world iff all of its duplicates in every world are atomic. In connection to 1), the hypothesis of idlers prompts four variants of Lewis's doctrine of perfectly natural properties, all deemed unsatisfactory for the purposes of duplication and recombination. By means of 2), instead, we show that the principle of recombination does not countenance the atomicity or non-atomicity of duplicates; but it should, because it is genuinely possible that: a) something, which is atomic, is non-atomic; and b) something, which is non-atomic, is atomic. In discussing 1) and 2), the paper substantiates a tension in Lewis's metaphysics between modal intuitions and the reliance on the natural sciences.

Natural properties and atomicity in modal realism / A. Borghini, L. Giorgio. - In: METAPHYSICA. - ISSN 1437-2053. - 16:1(2015), pp. 103-121. [10.1515/mp-2015-0010]

Natural properties and atomicity in modal realism

A. Borghini
Co-primo
;
2015

Abstract

The paper pinpoints certain unrecognized difficulties that surface for recombination and duplication in modal realism when we ask whether the following inter-world fixity claims hold true: 1) A property is perfectly natural in a world iff it is perfectly natural in every world where it is instantiated; 2) Something is mereologically atomic in a world iff all of its duplicates in every world are atomic. In connection to 1), the hypothesis of idlers prompts four variants of Lewis's doctrine of perfectly natural properties, all deemed unsatisfactory for the purposes of duplication and recombination. By means of 2), instead, we show that the principle of recombination does not countenance the atomicity or non-atomicity of duplicates; but it should, because it is genuinely possible that: a) something, which is atomic, is non-atomic; and b) something, which is non-atomic, is atomic. In discussing 1) and 2), the paper substantiates a tension in Lewis's metaphysics between modal intuitions and the reliance on the natural sciences.
David Lewis; Duplication; Modal plenitude; Modal realism; Natural properties; Principle of recombination; Philosophy
Settore M-FIL/05 - Filosofia e Teoria dei Linguaggi
2015
Article (author)
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Borghini_Lando_Metaphysica_2015.pdf

accesso riservato

Tipologia: Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione 416.44 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
416.44 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/533270
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact