The paper shows - contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks - that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merricks's argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
Counterpart Theory Vindicated : a Reply to Merricks / A. Borghini. - In: DIALECTICA. - ISSN 0012-2017. - 59:1(2005), pp. 67-73.
Counterpart Theory Vindicated : a Reply to Merricks
A. Borghini
2005
Abstract
The paper shows - contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks - that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merricks's argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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