In the 19th century arose the idea that the (emerging) social sciences should conform to the natural sciences (Comte). After the German historicism (Dilthey and Windelband) put into question this proposal, arguing that the two disciplines are different (in their epistemology and methodology), because different is the nature of their objects of study. From the epistemological perspective, this position is still dominant in the social sciences (although not always by the methodological one – e.g. the survey). According to a phenomenological and deconstructionist glance, the paper proposes a third way or ontology: it challenges the historicism (the second ontology), without falling back into the positivism (the first ontology). In other words, natural and social sciences are not at all so different (second ontology); however, they are not even similar (first ontology). One of the main differences between the two sciences lies in the type of credit that scientists give to their objects, the expectations that put on them, thinking them capable or not of agency (and therefore also of criticism). This issue can be indexed as the ‘problem of the audience’: social scientists’ findings are criticized and questioned even by their objects of study (e.g. migrants, gays, etc.), because researchers assign agency to them; while this does not happen in the natural sciences. According to Montagnier (the cells and water have memory), Latour (non-human agents), Tompkins and Bird (experiments on plants), Capra (the Tao of physics), Panikkar (teo-physics), Mary Hesse (socializing epistemology), etc., the paper will outline this third ontology.
Socializing natural sciences : towards a third ontology / G. Gobo. ((Intervento presentato al 12. convegno Differences, Inequalities and Sociological Imagination tenutosi a Prague nel 2015.
Socializing natural sciences : towards a third ontology
G. GoboPrimo
2015
Abstract
In the 19th century arose the idea that the (emerging) social sciences should conform to the natural sciences (Comte). After the German historicism (Dilthey and Windelband) put into question this proposal, arguing that the two disciplines are different (in their epistemology and methodology), because different is the nature of their objects of study. From the epistemological perspective, this position is still dominant in the social sciences (although not always by the methodological one – e.g. the survey). According to a phenomenological and deconstructionist glance, the paper proposes a third way or ontology: it challenges the historicism (the second ontology), without falling back into the positivism (the first ontology). In other words, natural and social sciences are not at all so different (second ontology); however, they are not even similar (first ontology). One of the main differences between the two sciences lies in the type of credit that scientists give to their objects, the expectations that put on them, thinking them capable or not of agency (and therefore also of criticism). This issue can be indexed as the ‘problem of the audience’: social scientists’ findings are criticized and questioned even by their objects of study (e.g. migrants, gays, etc.), because researchers assign agency to them; while this does not happen in the natural sciences. According to Montagnier (the cells and water have memory), Latour (non-human agents), Tompkins and Bird (experiments on plants), Capra (the Tao of physics), Panikkar (teo-physics), Mary Hesse (socializing epistemology), etc., the paper will outline this third ontology.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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