Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.
Methods for finding leader-follower equilibria with multiple followers : extended abstract / N. Basilico, S. Coniglio, N. Gatti (PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS). - In: AAMAS '16 : Proceedings[s.l] : ACM, 2016 May. - ISBN 9781450342391. - pp. 1363-1364 (( Intervento presentato al 15. convegno Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems tenutosi a Singapore nel 2016.
Methods for finding leader-follower equilibria with multiple followers : extended abstract
N. BasilicoPrimo
;
2016
Abstract
Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
p1363-basilico.pdf
accesso riservato
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione
771.18 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
771.18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
