The aim of this paper is to show how the well-known distinction between rules and principles, seen as two kinds of norms, is inadequate. A principle, far from depen- ding on meaning contents, depends only on the actual use of norms in legal argu- mentation. The very same norms can be used either as principles or as fact qua- lifications. In a nutshell, instead of accounting for two kinds of norm, we have to account for two completely different styles of legal argumentation.
Il superamento pragmatico dell'opposizione tra regole e princìpi / C. Luzzati. - In: MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA. - ISSN 1120-9607. - 46:1(2016), pp. 135-153. [10.1436/82981]
Il superamento pragmatico dell'opposizione tra regole e princìpi
C. LuzzatiPrimo
2016
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show how the well-known distinction between rules and principles, seen as two kinds of norms, is inadequate. A principle, far from depen- ding on meaning contents, depends only on the actual use of norms in legal argu- mentation. The very same norms can be used either as principles or as fact qua- lifications. In a nutshell, instead of accounting for two kinds of norm, we have to account for two completely different styles of legal argumentation.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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