The concept of involvement and the paradox of fiction

I will divide my paper into two parts. First of all, I will discuss three tentative solutions to the paradox of fiction that are, in my opinion, untenable. When arguing against these theories, special weight will be given to a single question: why and how is it possible to calm someone by repeating that what they are reading or looking at is a fiction? In the second part, I will suggest a realistic and anti‑judgmentalist solution to the paradox. It rests on what I believe to be general features of imagination, but it also implies an understanding of the primary relationship of involvement – a relationship that, in a way, echoes Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit. A concluding remark is devoted to the origin of the paradox: in my opinion it is not only an aftermath of a cognitive theory of emotion, but is also a clue to a mistaken attitude toward fiction.