In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.
Group size as selection device / F. De Sinopoli, L.F.. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - (2026). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1007/s00199-026-01714-3]
Group size as selection device
C. Meroni
2026
Abstract
In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.
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