This essay aims to critically examine the so-called communication theory of legal interpretation. Such theory, which is very widespread, claims that there is no relevant difference between ordinary conversation and legal interpretation, since both are ways of understanding an intentional communication. In particular, according to this theory, just as the content of an ordinary conversation is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intention, so the content of law is determined by the legislators’ communicative intentions. After briefly introducing the communication theory and the reasons behind it (§2), I will examine the theoretical criticisms that have been raised against it (§3), how its proponents react to those criticisms by modifying some elements of the theory, and whether such adjustments are sufficient to overcome the criticisms (§4). Then I will formulate an empirical critique against the communication theory in its various versions. I will argue that this theory is false –it does not provide a true description of legal interpretative practice– with respect to some legal systems –the constitutionalised legal systems (§5). Finally, I will briefly mention the consequences that the falsity of this theory yields with respect to some essential values of democratic states (§6).

La teoría comunicativa de la interpretación jurídica en los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados. Críticas teóricas y empíricas = The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation in the Constitutionalised Legal Systems. Theoretical and Empirical Critiques / F. Poggi. - In: ISONOMIA. - ISSN 1405-0218. - 2023:58(2023 Jun 10), pp. 1-25. [10.5347/isonomia.58/2023.658]

La teoría comunicativa de la interpretación jurídica en los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados. Críticas teóricas y empíricas = The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation in the Constitutionalised Legal Systems. Theoretical and Empirical Critiques

F. Poggi
2023

Abstract

This essay aims to critically examine the so-called communication theory of legal interpretation. Such theory, which is very widespread, claims that there is no relevant difference between ordinary conversation and legal interpretation, since both are ways of understanding an intentional communication. In particular, according to this theory, just as the content of an ordinary conversation is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intention, so the content of law is determined by the legislators’ communicative intentions. After briefly introducing the communication theory and the reasons behind it (§2), I will examine the theoretical criticisms that have been raised against it (§3), how its proponents react to those criticisms by modifying some elements of the theory, and whether such adjustments are sufficient to overcome the criticisms (§4). Then I will formulate an empirical critique against the communication theory in its various versions. I will argue that this theory is false –it does not provide a true description of legal interpretative practice– with respect to some legal systems –the constitutionalised legal systems (§5). Finally, I will briefly mention the consequences that the falsity of this theory yields with respect to some essential values of democratic states (§6).
Este ensayo pretende analizar críticamente la llamada teoría comunicativa de la interpretación jurídica: una teoría, muy popular hoy en día, que sostiene que no existe una diferencia relevante entre la conversación ordinaria y la interpretación jurídica, pues ambas son formas de entender una comunicación intencional. En particular, según esta teoría, al igual que el contenido de una conversación ordinaria está constituido por la intención comunicativa de su emisor, el contenido de la ley está determinado por las intenciones comunicativas de los legisladores. Después de delinear brevemente la teoría comunicativa y las razones que la sustentan (§2), examinaré las críticas teóricas que se han formulado en contra de ella (§3), cómo sus partidarios reaccionan ante tales críticas modificando algunos elementos de la teoría y si estos ajustes son suficientes para superar las críticas (§4). Después formularé una crítica de carácter empírico en contra de varias versiones de la teoría comunicativa: argumentaré que esta teoría es falsa con respecto a algunos ordenamientos jurídicos –en concreto, a los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados–, por no proporcionar una verdadera descripción de la práctica interpretativa jurídica (§5). Finalmente, mencionaré brevemente las consecuencias que la falsedad de esta teoría produce con respecto a algunos valores esenciales de los estados democráticos (§6).
interpretación jurídica; teoría comunicativa; intención legislativa; interpretación orientada a la constitución, contenido del derecho; Jeffrey Goldsworthy;
Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia del Diritto
10-giu-2023
https://isonomia.itam.mx/index.php/revista-cientifica/article/view/658
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/975748
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