Tenseless time Vs. tensed truthmakers

In a recent article in Dialectica, Dean Zimmerman has argued that the eternalist A-theorist (a.k.a. "moving spotlight" theorist) can distinguish her position from that of the B-theorist serious tenser, only by appealing to a «non-relativized kind of truth that applies to propositions that are only temporarily true» (Zimmerman, 2005, p. 453), namely a notion of truth simpliciter as applied to tensed propositions. In what follows I will argue that this notion is spurious, and cannot do the job. My critique's outline will remind Bergmann's critiques against "monsters", namely notions which, appearances notwithstanding, are irremediably blurred. The difference between the Btheorist serious tenser, and the eternalist A-theorist has rather to be drawn as a difference on whether tensed sentences require tensed truth-makers or not. My starting point will be a short détour through the debate over temporary intrinsics and presentism.