Judicial investigations into politicians are a fundamental component of politics, with these investigations often leading to public scandals. Yet, empirical evidence of the strategic determinants of judicial investigations is intrinsically hard to gather, a problem that has significantly limited the study of this important phenomenon. This paper studies the politics behind judicial investigations by leveraging new data on prosecutors’ informants in 1125 episodes of misbehavior of Italian MPs involved in different crimes (1983–2019). Results provide evidence in favor of a political use of denunciations for corruption crimes: when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies denounce past misbehavior of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral performance. Furthermore, weakened MPs are more likely to be accused of misbehavior that happened a long time before the accusation, which further supports the argument that accusations are politically motivated.

Politics by denunciation: Political whistleblowing against members of parliament in Italy / G.M. Invernizzi, A. Ceron. - In: ELECTORAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0261-3794. - 83:(2023 Jun), pp. 102601.1-102601.11. [10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102601]

Politics by denunciation: Political whistleblowing against members of parliament in Italy

A. Ceron
Co-primo
2023

Abstract

Judicial investigations into politicians are a fundamental component of politics, with these investigations often leading to public scandals. Yet, empirical evidence of the strategic determinants of judicial investigations is intrinsically hard to gather, a problem that has significantly limited the study of this important phenomenon. This paper studies the politics behind judicial investigations by leveraging new data on prosecutors’ informants in 1125 episodes of misbehavior of Italian MPs involved in different crimes (1983–2019). Results provide evidence in favor of a political use of denunciations for corruption crimes: when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies denounce past misbehavior of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral performance. Furthermore, weakened MPs are more likely to be accused of misbehavior that happened a long time before the accusation, which further supports the argument that accusations are politically motivated.
Corruption; Elections; Italy; Judicial Institutions; Political Parties; Political Scandals; Whistle-Blowing
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
   DEMOcracy under PressurE
   DEMOPE
   MINISTERO DELL'ISTRUZIONE E DEL MERITO
   2020NK2YHL_001
giu-2023
31-mar-2023
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/969920
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