Releyendo a Raz acerca de la autoridad, el derecho y la moral: ¿el positivista como apóstol del Made Law? = Re-reading Raz's teachings on authority, law and morality: Positivist as Apostol of the Made Law?

In a context where judicial discretion is determined by a pluralistic value framework, it is argued here that legal positivism is compatible with the idea of non-neutrality and the nonscientific character of jurisprudence on the one hand, and with the assertion of the intersubjectivity of legal discourse on the other. The aim of this article is to take up some of Raz's ideas and demonstrate their explanatory power in relation to legal practise, which is characterised by an eclectic approach that combines the ideals of scientificity and objectivity with a fundamental emphasis on social morality and critical morality. According to Raz's thesis, legal positivism is not incompatible with the idea that there is discretion in legal reasoning and interpretation and with the idea that the rule of law is neither a myth nor an illusion. Legal positivism explains the theoretical separability of law and morality and the factual connection between law and public morality, as well as the permeability of law/legal practise to meta-legal principles and the law's own moral values and beliefs. Following the 20th century debate and thanks to the teachings of Raz, the article evokes the discussion on the ordinamental perspective and its importance for legal positivism and renews the research on the idea of made law.