We design an efficient and transaction cost reduc- ing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction as part of a web service for the work allocation problem in temporary employment agencies. In this auction bids are work contracts with multi- dimensional salaries. To compute the allocation we assume that every temporary employment worker conveys a utility function specifying the utility gained from working a given job for a salary consisting of multiple components. We then embed the designed mechanism in an updated transaction phase model describing the repeated allocation of temporary agency workers to work assignments. We prove that the designed auction mechanism at the heart of the web service satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.

Web service based applications for electronic labor markets: A Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auction with Individual Utilities / R. Buettne, J. Landes - In: Proceedings of ICIW[s.l] : Friedrich Laux and Pascal Lorenz, 2012. - ISBN 978-1-61208-200-4. - pp. 168-177 (( Intervento presentato al 7. convegno International Conference on Internet and Web Applications and Services tenutosi a Stuttgart nel 2012.

Web service based applications for electronic labor markets: A Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auction with Individual Utilities

J. Landes
2012

Abstract

We design an efficient and transaction cost reduc- ing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction as part of a web service for the work allocation problem in temporary employment agencies. In this auction bids are work contracts with multi- dimensional salaries. To compute the allocation we assume that every temporary employment worker conveys a utility function specifying the utility gained from working a given job for a salary consisting of multiple components. We then embed the designed mechanism in an updated transaction phase model describing the repeated allocation of temporary agency workers to work assignments. We prove that the designed auction mechanism at the heart of the web service satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction; web service; electronic human resource management; mechanism design; multidimensional price
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/949075
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