We consider the problem of how a temporary employment agency allocates temporary agency workers to jobs. To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space. That is agents can specify how much a work contract consisting of several components such as wage per hour, days of leave, overtime premiums and hours of work is valued. We show that the mechanism we develop satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency
Job allocation in a temporary employment agency via multi-dimensional price VCG auctions using a multi-agent system / J. Landes, R. Buettner - In: MICAI '11: Proceedings of the 2011 10th Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence / [a cura di] Ildar Baturshin, Grigori Sidorov. - Washington : IEEE Computer Society, 2011. - ISBN 978-0-7695-4605-6. - pp. 182-187 (( Intervento presentato al 10. convegno Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence tenutosi a Puebla : November 26 - December 4 nel 2011 [10.1109/MICAI.2011.11].
Job allocation in a temporary employment agency via multi-dimensional price VCG auctions using a multi-agent system
J. Landes;
2011
Abstract
We consider the problem of how a temporary employment agency allocates temporary agency workers to jobs. To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space. That is agents can specify how much a work contract consisting of several components such as wage per hour, days of leave, overtime premiums and hours of work is valued. We show that the mechanism we develop satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
