We argue that David Lewis's principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism.
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference / J. Hawthorne, J. Landes, C. Wallmann, J. Williamson. - In: BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 0007-0882. - 68:1(2017), pp. 123-131. [10.1093/bjps/axv030]
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
J. Landes;
2017
Abstract
We argue that David Lewis's principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism.
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