Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.
On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias / J. Landes, B. Osimani. - In: JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 0925-4560. - 51:4(2020), pp. 525-549. [10.1007/s10838-020-09508-4]
On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias
J. Landes
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2020
Abstract
Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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