The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau's measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau's counter-examples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau's arguments.

The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence / J. Landes. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - 198:11(2021 Nov), pp. 10611-10641. [10.1007/s11229-020-02738-5]

The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence

J. Landes
2021

Abstract

The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau's measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau's counter-examples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau's arguments.
Variety of Evidence Thesis; Bayesian networks; Confirmation; Independence; Reliability;
Settore M-FIL/02 - Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
giu-2020
Article (author)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/938994
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