Although Kant is one of the very few classical writers referred to in the current literature on lying, hardly any attention is paid to how his views relate to the contemporary discussion on the definition of lying. I argue that, in Kant’s account, deception is not the defining feature of lying. Furthermore, his view is able to acknowledge non-deceptive lies. Kant thus holds, I suggest, a version of what is currently labelled Intrinsic Anti-Deceptionism. In his specific version of such a view, furthermore, dishonesty is the distinctive feature of lying. Finally, I highlight the important methodological differences between Kant’s normatively minded account and the primarily descriptive contemporary discussion, with regard to the role of intuitions and definitions in building a moral theory: In contrast to the current debate, Kant does not rely on intuitions, but defines lying in terms of the obligation it violates.

Lying, Deception and Dishonesty: Kant and the Contemporary Debate on the Definition of Lying / S. Bacin - In: Kant and the Problem of Morality : Rethinking the Contemporary World / [a cura di] L. Caranti, A. Pinzani. - [s.l] : Routledge, 2022 Jul 18. - ISBN 9781003043126. - pp. 73-91 [10.4324/9781003043126-6]

Lying, Deception and Dishonesty: Kant and the Contemporary Debate on the Definition of Lying

S. Bacin
2022-07-18

Abstract

Although Kant is one of the very few classical writers referred to in the current literature on lying, hardly any attention is paid to how his views relate to the contemporary discussion on the definition of lying. I argue that, in Kant’s account, deception is not the defining feature of lying. Furthermore, his view is able to acknowledge non-deceptive lies. Kant thus holds, I suggest, a version of what is currently labelled Intrinsic Anti-Deceptionism. In his specific version of such a view, furthermore, dishonesty is the distinctive feature of lying. Finally, I highlight the important methodological differences between Kant’s normatively minded account and the primarily descriptive contemporary discussion, with regard to the role of intuitions and definitions in building a moral theory: In contrast to the current debate, Kant does not rely on intuitions, but defines lying in terms of the obligation it violates.
lying; deception; dishonesty; Kant's ethics
Settore M-FIL/06 - Storia della Filosofia
Settore M-FIL/03 - Filosofia Morale
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/934395
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