This essay explores a number of issues central to a value-based yet positivist conception of law and legal interpretation. In particular, after some reflections on whether and in what sense a theory of law can be considered axiologically and/or methodologically superior, some classic issues in the theory of legal interpretation are discussed: the distinctions of noetic versus dianoetic interpretation, interpretatio legis versus iuris, and simple versus difficult cases. The analysis then focuses on the claim to correctness inherent in legal reasoning, on its pragmatic connotations, on its controversial relations to the thesis of the so-called separation of law and morality, and to ethical conformism. I argue that the conception of legal interpretation proposed by Isabel Lifante is instead a non-neutral conception of law that contributes to the reinforcement of a Dionysian and Herculean legal practice.
A constructivist conception of legal interpretation. Some critical remarks / S. Zorzetto. - In: REVUS. - ISSN 1581-7652. - 2022:48(2022 Jun 07), pp. 1-11. ((Intervento presentato al 1. convegno congress “En teoría hay mujeres (en teoría)” (27-28 September 2018, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona) tenutosi a Barcellona nel 2018 [10.4000/revus.8234].
A constructivist conception of legal interpretation. Some critical remarks
S. Zorzetto
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2022
Abstract
This essay explores a number of issues central to a value-based yet positivist conception of law and legal interpretation. In particular, after some reflections on whether and in what sense a theory of law can be considered axiologically and/or methodologically superior, some classic issues in the theory of legal interpretation are discussed: the distinctions of noetic versus dianoetic interpretation, interpretatio legis versus iuris, and simple versus difficult cases. The analysis then focuses on the claim to correctness inherent in legal reasoning, on its pragmatic connotations, on its controversial relations to the thesis of the so-called separation of law and morality, and to ethical conformism. I argue that the conception of legal interpretation proposed by Isabel Lifante is instead a non-neutral conception of law that contributes to the reinforcement of a Dionysian and Herculean legal practice.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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