Through a discussion of the recent historiography and analysis of archival records, this chapter explains the collapse of the Fascist regime during the Second World War by focusing in particular on the impact of Allied bombing. It argues that the manner in which the state and people prepared for and faced air attack provides illuminating insights into the nature of the regime. Indeed, the story of both active and passive air defences reflects many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini’s strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet in a situation where the world’s trade routes were dominated by the enemy, and the only major ally, Germany, had too many commitments of its own. As public morale was explicitly targeted by the Allies, the Regime tried to use raids to mobilise the population against them. However, the Regime failed to win the propaganda war: Allied propaganda encouraged the view of bombing as a prelude to an inevitable liberation, while Fascist mobilisation was undermined by the poor record of air raid protection and by the growing unpopularity of local authorities and of the Fascist party.
The Military Failure of the Regime: The War and the Bombings / C. Baldoli (ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY). - In: Rethinking the History of Italian Fascism / [a cura di] G. Albanese. - [s.l] : Routledge, 2022. - ISBN 9781003092933. [10.4324/9781003092933-4]
The Military Failure of the Regime: The War and the Bombings
C. Baldoli
2022
Abstract
Through a discussion of the recent historiography and analysis of archival records, this chapter explains the collapse of the Fascist regime during the Second World War by focusing in particular on the impact of Allied bombing. It argues that the manner in which the state and people prepared for and faced air attack provides illuminating insights into the nature of the regime. Indeed, the story of both active and passive air defences reflects many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini’s strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet in a situation where the world’s trade routes were dominated by the enemy, and the only major ally, Germany, had too many commitments of its own. As public morale was explicitly targeted by the Allies, the Regime tried to use raids to mobilise the population against them. However, the Regime failed to win the propaganda war: Allied propaganda encouraged the view of bombing as a prelude to an inevitable liberation, while Fascist mobilisation was undermined by the poor record of air raid protection and by the growing unpopularity of local authorities and of the Fascist party.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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