The international governance of biological weapons: between non-proliferation policies and health security strategies

Biological weapons (BW) and agents occupy a very peculiar position in the landscape of transboundary security threats. Since diseases know no borders, the problem posed by the intentional release or accidental circulation of biological agents is truly “global.” Under this perspective, it is no surprise that its related regime has evolved into a complex network of nested and overlapping institutions and expanded well beyond its core treaties (the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention). Such a complex system includes more informal networks and shapes fluid interactions at the interface between distinct issue-areas of international relations (namely security and health). Scholars and practitioners have blamed the multiplication of international laws and rules for introducing negative externalities that can erode the significance of institutions operating in complex/multifaceted environments, thus making the overall regime indifferent at best, if not inefficient. This paper challenges such stance by introducing a new dataset which gathers information about 24 institutions contributing to the biological non-proliferation regime complex and by developing measures of state exposure to the regime in terms of overall embeddedness and compliance. The study indicates that the emerging health-security interface offers many advantages: it champions a cooperation structure easier to manage, enlarges the scope for deal-making, and better contributes to the consolidation and promotion of customary law - through the creation of common ground and language among states. Finally, by developing mutually-reinforcing compliance measures and “in-kind” mechanisms, the regime dramatically increases the pool of information available on traditionally sensitive and protected issues.