After the Cortes Generales were ritually dissolved on 26th October 2015, Spain was ruled by a caretaker government for more than a year, until 29th October 2016, because of the political impossibility of electing a new Prime Minister. In this exceptional situation, two general elections were called (December 2015 and June 2016) and three different Parliaments succeeded but, most of all, the interim Government refused to submit to parliamentary control, alleging that the failing approval of a motion of confidence impeded the elected Parliament to exercise this power. The Constitutional Court ruled that such behavior was unconstitutional, because it hampered illegally the development of ordinary prerogatives of the Legislative, which derive from popular representation. Finally, some lines will be dedicated to the changes that Spanish parliamentarism has experienced since the restoration of democracy and the influence that such kind of control could have in (or could get from) shaping a new relation between the Legislative and Executive powers.

Neanche un Governo “dimissionario” è sottratto alla attività di controllo del Parlamento. Alcune riflessioni a partire dalla STC 124/2018 del Tribunal Constitucional spagnolo / D. Camoni. - In: OSSERVATORIO COSTITUZIONALE. - ISSN 2283-7515. - 2019:1-2(2019 Apr 12), pp. 148-166.

Neanche un Governo “dimissionario” è sottratto alla attività di controllo del Parlamento. Alcune riflessioni a partire dalla STC 124/2018 del Tribunal Constitucional spagnolo

D. Camoni
2019

Abstract

After the Cortes Generales were ritually dissolved on 26th October 2015, Spain was ruled by a caretaker government for more than a year, until 29th October 2016, because of the political impossibility of electing a new Prime Minister. In this exceptional situation, two general elections were called (December 2015 and June 2016) and three different Parliaments succeeded but, most of all, the interim Government refused to submit to parliamentary control, alleging that the failing approval of a motion of confidence impeded the elected Parliament to exercise this power. The Constitutional Court ruled that such behavior was unconstitutional, because it hampered illegally the development of ordinary prerogatives of the Legislative, which derive from popular representation. Finally, some lines will be dedicated to the changes that Spanish parliamentarism has experienced since the restoration of democracy and the influence that such kind of control could have in (or could get from) shaping a new relation between the Legislative and Executive powers.
Settore IUS/21 - Diritto Pubblico Comparato
Settore IUS/08 - Diritto Costituzionale
12-apr-2019
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/921514
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