DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF KNOWLEDGE

Democracy and the Rule of Knowledge The work starts from the analyses of epistocratic theorists, reconstructing their criticism to democracy in order to develop a broader reflection on the role of political knowledge (episteme) within democratic paradigm. The thesis aims to present knowledge as vital component of political agency that democracy assumes and institutionalizes. Nonetheless, epistocrats’ epistemic reductionism represents a misinterpretation of such an agency and, accordingly, the remedies they support are presented as a misunderstanding of episteme’s reach and function in political process. Chapter 1 focuses on epistocrats’ account of citizens’ epistemic littleness, emphasizing how ignorance and irrationality characterize their participation to political decision-making. Chapter 2 deals with the notion of political knowledge assumed by epistocracy: episteme is understood as a body of factual information, which constitutes the cognitive background of political decision-making. Chapter 3 argues that epistocratic interpretation of democracy recalls instrumentalism and, with it, the questionable assumption of politics as a mere epistemic practice. On the contrary, the thesis collocates the role of episteme in a procedural understanding of democracy, asserting that democracy embodies an “enlightened procedure”. In this view, democracy institutionalizes people’s capacity to formulate and consider factual truths (“serviceable truths”) concerning the context in which they operate as decision-makers. Chapter 4 challenges epistocracy by proposing an alternative institutional approach to deal with political ignorance. Democratic institutions have the duty to empower citizens’ epistemic agency, transforming the assumption of that agency into the commitment to spread political knowledge in society.