I vincoli di bilancio in alcuni ordinamenti degli Stati europei e negli Stati Uniti

This paper highlights the problematics regarding the provisions and the national implementations of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. Also called TSCG, this international treaty establishes budget balance rules for the Eurozone States, in order to prevent future instabilities in cases of economic crises. A comparison with the U.S. experience on the subject – regarding both the genesis of these budgetary constraints and their characteristics – is given in order to better explain the gaps left by the European law. Whereas the U.S. budgetary system was established by the independent laws of different States, the TSCG designs a series of norms which have to be implemented in every State of the Eurozone, with a top-down approach, in order to create a harmonized system throughout all the States. Nonetheless, the Treaty itself has many gaps which have been differently filled by national laws. These gaps regard relevant aspects of the discipline: even the characteristics of the constraints themselves are not clearly established. Moreover, the implementation of the TSCG has been conducted in different ways, because of the different stages of development of the national budgetary laws. Germany has always focused on the financial stability of the Federation; Spain urged a reform in financial law because of the crisis; Italy changed its Constitution to comply to the TSCG; France had an ongoing process of modernization of the Constitution. The TSCG is designed to promote financial stability; however, it impedes redistribution policies, creating tensions among the Eurozone States. In this sense, other solutions giving more responsibility and power to the central organs of the EU might be more effective.