Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others’ beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both–with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks.
Coordination without meta-representation / C. Colombo, F. Guala. - In: PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. - ISSN 0951-5089. - (2021 Dec 09), pp. 1-34. [Epub ahead of print] [10.1080/09515089.2021.2014443]
Coordination without meta-representation
F. Guala
Secondo
2021
Abstract
Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others’ beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both–with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks.
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