Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of ‘belief-less reasoning’, a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation.

Rational Coordination without Beliefs / C. Colombo, F. Guala. - In: ERKENNTNIS. - ISSN 0165-0106. - (2021), pp. 1-16. [Epub ahead of print] [10.1007/s10670-021-00496-5]

Rational Coordination without Beliefs

F. Guala
Secondo
2021

Abstract

Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of ‘belief-less reasoning’, a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation.
Settore M-FIL/02 - Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
   Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018-2022 - Dipartimento di FILOSOFIA
   MINISTERO DELL'ISTRUZIONE E DEL MERITO
2021
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/901999
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