In this paper, we test whether dynastic leaders differ in their policymaking once in office. Based on a large sample of Italian dynastic mayors, we do not find differences in policy making in terms of average revenue and expenditure. However, dynastic mayors increase spending and obtain higher transfers during the pre-electoral year. We suggest that they might behave more strategically both because they can (thanks to inherited political skills) and because of higher interest to stay in office (due to higher returns from politics).
Dynasties and Policymaking / G. Daniele, A.F. Romarri, P. Vertier. - In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. - ISSN 0176-2680. - 190(2021), pp. 89-110. [10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.023]
Dynasties and Policymaking
G. DanielePrimo
;A.F. RomarriSecondo
;
2021
Abstract
In this paper, we test whether dynastic leaders differ in their policymaking once in office. Based on a large sample of Italian dynastic mayors, we do not find differences in policy making in terms of average revenue and expenditure. However, dynastic mayors increase spending and obtain higher transfers during the pre-electoral year. We suggest that they might behave more strategically both because they can (thanks to inherited political skills) and because of higher interest to stay in office (due to higher returns from politics).
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