The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis.
Contra el modelo conversacional de la interpretación jurídica : La diferencia entre intención legislativa e intención del hablante / F. Poggi. - In: REVUS. - ISSN 1581-7652. - 42:(2020), pp. 1-16. [10.4000/revus.6527]
Contra el modelo conversacional de la interpretación jurídica : La diferencia entre intención legislativa e intención del hablante
F. Poggi
2020
Abstract
The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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