Orthodoxy has it that all counterpossibles are vacuously true. Yet there are strong argumentsboth for and against the use of non-vacuous counterpossibles in metaphysics. Even more compelling evidence may be expected from science. Arguably philosophy should defer to best scientific practice. If scientific practice comes with a commitment to non-vacuous counterpossibles, this may be the decisive reason to reject semantic orthodoxy and accept nonvacuity. I critically examine various examples of the purported scientific use of non-vacuous counterpossibles and argue that they are not convincing. They neither establish that scientific practice comes with a commitment to the non-vacuity of counterpossibles, nor that incurring such a commitment would be useful in scientific practice. I illustrate a variety of counterstrategies on behalf of orthodoxy.
The Counterpossibles of Science vs. the Science of Counterpossibles / D. Dohrn. - In: BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 0007-0882. - (2021). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1086/716769]
|Titolo:||The Counterpossibles of Science vs. the Science of Counterpossibles|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore M-FIL/05 - Filosofia e Teoria dei Linguaggi|
Settore M-FIL/02 - Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
|Data di pubblicazione:||2021|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/716769|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|