The most evident shortcoming of the international agreements on climate actions is the compliance to their prescriptions. Can John Rawls’s social contract theory help us to solve the problem? We apply the veil of ignorance decision-making setting in a sequential dictator game to study the compliance to climate change agreements and we test the model in a laboratory experiment. The veil of ignorance shows to be very powerful at inducing the subjects to converge on a sustainable intergenerational path. However, the voluntary compliance to the agreement still remains an open issue, because even small incentives to defect can undermine the compliance stability, and therefore break the whole sustainable dynamic.

John Rawls and compliance to climate change agreements : insights from a laboratory experiment / K. Klaser, L. Sacconi, M. Faillo. - In: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1567-9764. - 21:3(2021 Sep), pp. 531-551. [10.1007/s10784-021-09533-8]

John Rawls and compliance to climate change agreements : insights from a laboratory experiment

L. Sacconi;
2021

Abstract

The most evident shortcoming of the international agreements on climate actions is the compliance to their prescriptions. Can John Rawls’s social contract theory help us to solve the problem? We apply the veil of ignorance decision-making setting in a sequential dictator game to study the compliance to climate change agreements and we test the model in a laboratory experiment. The veil of ignorance shows to be very powerful at inducing the subjects to converge on a sustainable intergenerational path. However, the voluntary compliance to the agreement still remains an open issue, because even small incentives to defect can undermine the compliance stability, and therefore break the whole sustainable dynamic.
Compliance; Experimental economics; International climate change agreements; John Rawls; Social contract theory
Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/871438
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