“The struggle for understanding”. Words, language games, local ideologies and cosmopolitism by Vincenzo Matera The philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein, although often held to be such, was not a relativist. His thought – concerning forms of live and language games – was misunderstood and reduced to the formula “The limits of my world determine the limits of my language”, that is, the limits of the language games I can play, of my intersubjective system of references, of my areas of social interaction are the limits of my com- prehension: what I can understand, judge, my values etc., is embedded into the space I live in, sharply sep- arated from other spaces and other worlds and other languages. Wittgenstein, in my opinion, does not state this; the misunderstanding can be resumed in the statement: “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him”. In this article I argue for a wide and universalist comprehension of wittgensteinian thought, based on a deepening of the link between words, practices, experience, ideology.
“Comprendersi con fatica”. Parole, giochi linguistici, ideologie locali e cosmopolitismo / V. Matera. - In: LA RICERCA FOLKLORICA. - ISSN 0391-9099. - 75:(2020), pp. 193-206.
“Comprendersi con fatica”. Parole, giochi linguistici, ideologie locali e cosmopolitismo
V. Matera
2020
Abstract
“The struggle for understanding”. Words, language games, local ideologies and cosmopolitism by Vincenzo Matera The philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein, although often held to be such, was not a relativist. His thought – concerning forms of live and language games – was misunderstood and reduced to the formula “The limits of my world determine the limits of my language”, that is, the limits of the language games I can play, of my intersubjective system of references, of my areas of social interaction are the limits of my com- prehension: what I can understand, judge, my values etc., is embedded into the space I live in, sharply sep- arated from other spaces and other worlds and other languages. Wittgenstein, in my opinion, does not state this; the misunderstanding can be resumed in the statement: “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him”. In this article I argue for a wide and universalist comprehension of wittgensteinian thought, based on a deepening of the link between words, practices, experience, ideology.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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