Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “in-t e r n o”, this article proposes an alternative conception of normativist legal positivism. The arti-cle argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal discourses, including theoretical ones. To pursue these goals the article first analyzes Redondo’s theses on the ontolog y / epistemolog y distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge, and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate cri-terion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs to the fields of normativity and practical reason. The following sections then discuss reductio-nist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propo-sitions, and beliefs) and the theory of legal sources. The final section addresses the question of the axiological neutrality of legal theory and discusses the possibility of describing participants’ internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).

Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics = Positivismo jurídico normativo: de la metafísica a la polític / S. Zorzetto. - In: ISONOMIA. - ISSN 1405-0218. - 54:2(2021), pp. 134-166. [10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.463]

Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics = Positivismo jurídico normativo: de la metafísica a la polític

S. Zorzetto
Primo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2021

Abstract

Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “in-t e r n o”, this article proposes an alternative conception of normativist legal positivism. The arti-cle argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal discourses, including theoretical ones. To pursue these goals the article first analyzes Redondo’s theses on the ontolog y / epistemolog y distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge, and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate cri-terion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs to the fields of normativity and practical reason. The following sections then discuss reductio-nist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propo-sitions, and beliefs) and the theory of legal sources. The final section addresses the question of the axiological neutrality of legal theory and discusses the possibility of describing participants’ internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).
El presente trabajo toma como punto de partida el libro Positivismo jurídico “inter-n o”, de María Cristina Redondo, y propone una concepción alternativa de positivismo jurídico normativista. En el artículo se sostiene que la teoría del derecho puede ser neutral en la medida en que sea intersubjetiva y transparente en cuanto a sus propias premisas metafísicas. Los ob-jetivos del trabajo, entonces, son, por un lado, el de echar luz acerca del papel que cumplen la metafísica y el sentido común en la construcción del concepto de derecho; por el otro lado, el de hacer más abiertamente transparentes las elecciones ético-políticas que constituyen a los discursos jurídicos, incluidos los teóricos. El trabajo analiza las tesis de Redondo acerca de la distinción entre ontología y epistemología y la posibilidad de conocimiento objetivo: la idea central defendida es que la inter-subjetividad, y no la objetividad, debería ser el criterio apropia-do para el positivismo jurídico normativista. Luego se examina el rol de la normatividad en el positivismo jurídico normativista, enfocándose en la naturaleza metafísica de la tesis de que el derecho pertenece a los campos de la normatividad y la razón práctica. Las secciones siguientes examinan las concepciones reduccionistas y anti-reduccionistas sobre las “entidades” jurídicas (normas, enunciados normativos, proposiciones y creencias) y la teoría de las fuentes del dere-cho. La sección final aborda la cuestión de la neutralidad valorativa de la teoría jurídica y analiza la posibilidad de describir el punto de vista interno de los participantes sin asumir compromiso alguno con la práctica jurídica existente.
common sense; legal method; legal positivism; metaphysics; normativity
Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia del Diritto
https://isonomia.itam.mx/index.php/revista-cientifica/article/view/463/1567
Article (author)
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
document.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione 332.25 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
332.25 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/862985
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact