We adapt tag-variables and Buchberger reduction in order, given two elements, pg is an element of R into an effective ring R, to express g as the evaluation of a polynomial f(X) is an element of R[X] at p, g=f(p). As a by-product, we present also an attack to a couple of Cryptographical protocols.
Why you cannot even hope to use Ore algebras in Cryptography / M. Ceria, T. Mora, A. Visconti. - In: APPLICABLE ALGEBRA IN ENGINEERING COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTING. - ISSN 0938-1279. - (2021). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1007/s00200-021-00493-9]
Why you cannot even hope to use Ore algebras in Cryptography
M. Ceria
Primo
;A. ViscontiUltimo
2021
Abstract
We adapt tag-variables and Buchberger reduction in order, given two elements, pg is an element of R into an effective ring R, to express g as the evaluation of a polynomial f(X) is an element of R[X] at p, g=f(p). As a by-product, we present also an attack to a couple of Cryptographical protocols.
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