In this article, I provide a rational choice-oriented explanation of how the Council of State became an equilibrium in the Italian political system. The variance of political regimes and governments makes Italy an interesting case to study the stability of the court and its relevance for the political actors and public administration. After pre- senting theories of judicial power and the main evolutions of the Council through history, I argue that government instability and heterogeneity, combined with struc- tural weaknesses of the public administration can be key factors in explaining the long-term survival of the institution.

Quando la logica burocratica conviene : nascita ed evoluzione del Consiglio di Stato nel sistema politico italiano / E. Rebessi. - In: RIVISTA ITALIANA DI POLITICHE PUBBLICHE. - ISSN 1722-1137. - 2020:2(2020 Aug 02), pp. 247-273. [10.1483/98089]

Quando la logica burocratica conviene : nascita ed evoluzione del Consiglio di Stato nel sistema politico italiano

E. Rebessi
2020

Abstract

In this article, I provide a rational choice-oriented explanation of how the Council of State became an equilibrium in the Italian political system. The variance of political regimes and governments makes Italy an interesting case to study the stability of the court and its relevance for the political actors and public administration. After pre- senting theories of judicial power and the main evolutions of the Council through history, I argue that government instability and heterogeneity, combined with struc- tural weaknesses of the public administration can be key factors in explaining the long-term survival of the institution.
Courts; Public administration; Italian political system; Rational choice institutionalism
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
2-ago-2020
Article (author)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/795291
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