L'ESSERE DISUMANO. IL DA-SEIN NEI 'BEITRÄGE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE' DI HEIDEGGER.

My thesis aims to detect the role of Da-sein in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie and shows how this should be understood as a new concept compared to the notion of Dasein presented in Sein und Zeit. I claim that Da-sein is not Dasein: these two notions involve two meanings and two different ontological accounts. In order to prove that, in the first chapter I analyse the characteristics of Dasein in Sein und Zeit, so arguing that Dasein and the human beings are two interchangeable terms: Dasein does not indicate the way of being of the human being, rather the human being as a being. Then, I use Heidegger’s works written before Beiträge in order to analyse the genesis of Da-sein and, at the same time, the genesis of all the other concepts required to understand its features. In so doing, I isolate three main philosophical domains that, in my opinion, characterise Heidegger’s thought during the early 1930s: the Greeks (second chapter), Nietzsche (third chapter) and Hölderlin (fourth chapter). Through his analysis of Greek philosophy (especially through the analysis of the concepts of physis, aletheia and logos), Heidegger puts the basis to elaborate a new ontology, grounded on the Being (Seyn) as such, and not on that being which questions the meaning of Being (Sein), namely Dasein. Thanks to Nietzsche, Heidegger starts conceiving the end of Western metaphysics and the role of the subject in it. As a consequence, Heidegger argues that the structure of history is ontologically oriented and that the metaphysical subject lies on the opposite side of Da-sein. Finally, by reading Hölderlin Heidegger acquires the philosophical instruments to think beyond this end and beyond this subject; that is, he offers the theoretical tools to understand the necessity of the withdrawal of Being and to locate the human being within this necessity. Therefore, in the fifth chapter, I analyse Beiträge on the light of all these theorical frames, gathering them around the problem of Da-sein. In so doing, I show that Da-sein 1) does not indicate the human being, but an ontological place (Ort) that has to be occupied by human being; 2) this place is where Seyn allows human being to ground the being; 3) in metaphysics, this place is closed and the human finds itself outside the Da-sein and it could not properly ground the being; 4) after the end of metaphysics, we have the chance to open again this place, understanding the reasons of its closing, and to situate the human being in the Da-sein.