In bicameral parliaments, upper chambers amend the bills that have been passed by lower chambers, and sometimes bills that are passed in one chamber never become law and just ‘die’ in the other. Why does one chamber fail or refuse to anticipate what the other will do? What can lead the political actors in one chamber to ‘waste’ their time and resources on a bill that will be never approved as law? How can we explain the variations in the number of such ‘useless’ approvals? This article helps answer these questions by focusing on ‘useless approvals’ in the Italian parliament (1979–2018). Italy offers an ideal setting to analyse this phenomenon, with two houses holding the same powers but characterised by varying degrees of political incongruence over time. We found that differences in preference between the two chambers positively affect the chances of useless approvals, above all for private members’ bills.

Useless approvals : Italian bicameralism and its decisional capacity / A. Pedrazzani, F. Zucchini. - In: THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES. - ISSN 1357-2334. - 26:4(2020 Oct 01), pp. 578-605. [10.1080/13572334.2020.1787014]

Useless approvals : Italian bicameralism and its decisional capacity

A. Pedrazzani
Primo
;
F. Zucchini
Ultimo
2020

Abstract

In bicameral parliaments, upper chambers amend the bills that have been passed by lower chambers, and sometimes bills that are passed in one chamber never become law and just ‘die’ in the other. Why does one chamber fail or refuse to anticipate what the other will do? What can lead the political actors in one chamber to ‘waste’ their time and resources on a bill that will be never approved as law? How can we explain the variations in the number of such ‘useless’ approvals? This article helps answer these questions by focusing on ‘useless approvals’ in the Italian parliament (1979–2018). Italy offers an ideal setting to analyse this phenomenon, with two houses holding the same powers but characterised by varying degrees of political incongruence over time. We found that differences in preference between the two chambers positively affect the chances of useless approvals, above all for private members’ bills.
Bicameralism; executive-legislative relations; Italy; lawmaking; political institutions
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
Settore SPS/11 - Sociologia dei Fenomeni Politici
   Politics e Policy in Europa in tempo di crisi: Cause e Conseguenze
   MINISTERO DELL'ISTRUZIONE E DEL MERITO
   2015P7RCL5_001

   PIANO DI SOSTEGNO ALLA RICERCA 2015-2017 - TRANSITION GRANT LINEA 1A PROGETTO "UNIMI PARTENARIATI H2020"
   UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO
1-ott-2020
10-lug-2020
Article (author)
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
UselessApprovals_postprints.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Pre-print (manoscritto inviato all'editore)
Dimensione 1.07 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.07 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pedrazzani Zucchini 2020.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione 2.56 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
2.56 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/750631
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact