The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis.
Against the conversational model of legal interpretation / F. Poggi. - In: REVUS. - ISSN 1581-7652. - (2020). [Epub ahead of print] [10.4000/revus.5694]
Against the conversational model of legal interpretation
F. Poggi
2020
Abstract
The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis.
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