It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P* , then P* should be true—in at least a cer- tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ- ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.
Fictional Content / E. Paganini. - In: DISPUTATIO. - ISSN 0873-626X. - 11:54(2019 Dec), pp. 255-269. ((Intervento presentato al convegno III BLASCO DISPUTATIO: SINGULAR TERMS IN FICTION tenutosi a Valencia nel 2017.
Fictional Content
E. Paganini
2019
Abstract
It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P* , then P* should be true—in at least a cer- tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ- ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
2019 - Disputatio (Fictional Content).pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione
139.18 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
139.18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.