It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P* , then P* should be true—in at least a cer- tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ- ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.

Fictional Content / E. Paganini. - In: DISPUTATIO. - ISSN 0873-626X. - 11:54(2019 Dec), pp. 255-269. ((Intervento presentato al convegno III BLASCO DISPUTATIO: SINGULAR TERMS IN FICTION tenutosi a Valencia nel 2017.

Fictional Content

E. Paganini
2019-12

Abstract

It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P* , then P* should be true—in at least a cer- tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ- ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.
Truth in fiction; non-truth-conditional content in fiction; propositions; objectivity; dispositions
Settore M-FIL/05 - Filosofia e Teoria dei Linguaggi
Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018-2022 - Dipartimento di FILOSOFIA
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/732904
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