This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three different compensation schemes—piece rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament—associated with a real effort task and we measure risk behaviour both before and after the effort task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared with piece-rate compensation and in some specifications produces negative peer effects. Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers and self-reported peer influence.
Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour : an experiment / F. Gioia. - In: THEORY AND DECISION. - ISSN 0040-5833. - 87:4(2019), pp. 473-495.
|Titolo:||Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour : an experiment|
GIOIA, FRANCESCA (Corresponding)
|Parole Chiave:||Competition; Equal-split-sharing-rule; Incentive schemes; Peer effects; Risk behaviour|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09717-4|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|