How do international actors influence democratization in developing countries? Which actions do they undertake to support democratization processes? Are they successful? Are they cost-effective? Which unintended consequences do they provoke? In examining those questions, I would like to focus on one form of democracy promotion: international observation of elections. The study of election observation is one of the topics of the very large field of study on democratization and, more specifically, democracy-promotion and assistance. Specifically, the question to which I would like to answer is of the last type: Which unintended consequences does it cause? In fact, looking at the effect of international election observation on election-day fraud means trying to discover the influence of the simple presence of observers on the behaviour of candidates, electoral staff, and voters. Even if proponents of election observation promote this instrument claiming its potential to reduce fraud, that capability (that must first be proved) can be numbered among the “unintended consequences” of international election observation since the stated role of observers is simply to “observe and report” on an electoral process. Its potential to reassure the electorate that it is safe for them to vote (and to run for the election) and/or to deter fraud, while a fundamental element of the role of observers, is not technically part of the observers’ job: those are, as much as possible, some of the “positive” spill-over effects or unintended consequences, something that the mere presence of observers can provoke under certain circumstances without they explicitly mean to cause them. International actors now play a prominent role in domestic elections in democratizing countries: they pressure governments to hold democratic elections and they are directly involved in the electoral process by providing technical assistance, funding or by sending international observers. Is it true that electoral observation can bring cleaner elections, as proponents of this costly enterprise assert? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance to the evaluation of the efficiency of election observation. We want to know if we are spending well our limited resources (in term of time, money, staff, etc.), if our efforts in that direction are worth doing, if our actions bring the expected consequences.

Election observation missions and election-day fraud: how to assess effectiveness? / M. Regalia. ((Intervento presentato al convegno ECPR Graduate Conference tenutosi a Dublin nel 2010.

Election observation missions and election-day fraud: how to assess effectiveness?

M. Regalia
2010

Abstract

How do international actors influence democratization in developing countries? Which actions do they undertake to support democratization processes? Are they successful? Are they cost-effective? Which unintended consequences do they provoke? In examining those questions, I would like to focus on one form of democracy promotion: international observation of elections. The study of election observation is one of the topics of the very large field of study on democratization and, more specifically, democracy-promotion and assistance. Specifically, the question to which I would like to answer is of the last type: Which unintended consequences does it cause? In fact, looking at the effect of international election observation on election-day fraud means trying to discover the influence of the simple presence of observers on the behaviour of candidates, electoral staff, and voters. Even if proponents of election observation promote this instrument claiming its potential to reduce fraud, that capability (that must first be proved) can be numbered among the “unintended consequences” of international election observation since the stated role of observers is simply to “observe and report” on an electoral process. Its potential to reassure the electorate that it is safe for them to vote (and to run for the election) and/or to deter fraud, while a fundamental element of the role of observers, is not technically part of the observers’ job: those are, as much as possible, some of the “positive” spill-over effects or unintended consequences, something that the mere presence of observers can provoke under certain circumstances without they explicitly mean to cause them. International actors now play a prominent role in domestic elections in democratizing countries: they pressure governments to hold democratic elections and they are directly involved in the electoral process by providing technical assistance, funding or by sending international observers. Is it true that electoral observation can bring cleaner elections, as proponents of this costly enterprise assert? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance to the evaluation of the efficiency of election observation. We want to know if we are spending well our limited resources (in term of time, money, staff, etc.), if our efforts in that direction are worth doing, if our actions bring the expected consequences.
30-ago-2010
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
ECPR
Election observation missions and election-day fraud: how to assess effectiveness? / M. Regalia. ((Intervento presentato al convegno ECPR Graduate Conference tenutosi a Dublin nel 2010.
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