In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and robustness against iterated deletion of dominated strategies and inferior replies.
Strategic stability in Poisson games / F. De Sinopoli, C. Meroni, C. Pimienta. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0022-0531. - 153:1(2014 Sep), pp. 46-63. [10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.005]
Strategic stability in Poisson games
C. Meroni;
2014
Abstract
In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and robustness against iterated deletion of dominated strategies and inferior replies.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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