We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled-labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low-skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high-skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.
The political economy of trade and migration : evidence from the U.S. Congress / P. Conconi, G. Facchini, M.F. Steinhardt, M. Zanardi. - In: ECONOMICS & POLITICS. - ISSN 0954-1985. - (2019 Nov 11). [Epub ahead of print]
|Titolo:||The political economy of trade and migration : evidence from the U.S. Congress|
|Parole Chiave:||immigration reforms; roll-call votes; trade reforms|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||11-nov-2019|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|