Social life rests in large part on the capacity to understand the intentional behavior of others. Which are the origins of this capacity? How is to construe its development in ontogenesis? By taking for granted that action understanding can be explained only in terms of the ability to read the mind of others, i.e. to represent them as having mental states, the traditional view claims the existence of sharp discontinuity in both its phylogeny and ontogeny. Over the last few years this view has been challenged by a number of ethological and psychological studies as well as by several neurophysiological findings. In particular, the functional properties of mirror neuron systems and its direct matching mechanism indicate that action understanding is primarily based on the motor cognition that underpins one’s own capacity to act. The aim of this paper is to elaborate and motivate the pivotal role of such a motor cognition, providing a biologically plausible and theoretically unitary account for the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding and also its impairment, like in the case of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD).
|Titolo:||Motor Cognition and Its Role in Philogeny and Ontogeny of Action Understanding.|
|Parole Chiave:||action understanding ; motor cognition ; mirror neurons ; autism ; social cognition|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore M-PSI/04 - Psicologia dello Sviluppo e Psicologia dell'Educazione|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2009|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1037/a0014436|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|