We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of lsquopurersquo free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game
Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments / R.M. Burlando, F. Guala. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - 8:1(2005 Apr), pp. 35-54.
Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
F. GualaUltimo
2005
Abstract
We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of lsquopurersquo free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the gamePubblicazioni consigliate
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