The importance of reputation in human societies is highlighted both by theoretical models and empirical studies. In this paper, we have extended the scope of previous experimental studies based on trust games by creating treatments where players can rate their opponents' behavior and know their past ratings. Our results showed that being rated by other players and letting this rating be known are factors that increase cooperation levels even when rational reputational investment motives are ruled out. More generally, subjects tended to respond to reputational opportunities even when this was neither rational nor explainable by reciprocity.
Reputational Cues in Repeated Trust Games / R. Boero, G. Bravo, M. Castellani, F. Squazzoni. - In: JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1053-5357. - 38:6(2009), pp. 871-877. [10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004]
Reputational Cues in Repeated Trust Games
F. Squazzoni
Ultimo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2009
Abstract
The importance of reputation in human societies is highlighted both by theoretical models and empirical studies. In this paper, we have extended the scope of previous experimental studies based on trust games by creating treatments where players can rate their opponents' behavior and know their past ratings. Our results showed that being rated by other players and letting this rating be known are factors that increase cooperation levels even when rational reputational investment motives are ruled out. More generally, subjects tended to respond to reputational opportunities even when this was neither rational nor explainable by reciprocity.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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